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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of our nation's history, the common law of
most jurisdictions in the United States has established that a plaintiff
has a right to recover punitive damages in a civil suit.' However, the
apparently dramatic increase in the number and dollar amount of
punitive damage awards over the last several decades has fueled a
1. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1990); Thomas C. Galligan, Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of
Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 31 n.110 (1990).
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debate over the propriety of allowing punitive damages.2 Opponents
of punitive damages blame excessive awards by passionate and unso-
phisticated juries for more expensive and less available goods and
services.3 Although proponents of punitive damages challenge the
existence of a punitive damage crisis, 4  state legislatures have
attempted to take the reins by instituting statutes that reduce the
availability of punitive damage awards to plaintiffs.5
Nine states recently enacted legislation that allocates a portion of
a punitive damage award to a state fund.6 Cases challenging these
state extraction statutes are now beginning to appear in the courts and
indicate a divergence of opinion regarding their constitutional valid-
ity.7 One of the more intriguing issues these cases raise is whether the
allocation of a punitive damage award to the state constitutes an
improper taking of private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth
2. Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 3-4.
3. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 21
(1990); Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 55-56, 61 (1990).
4. See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, supra note 1.
5. MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 40.02, at 40-6 (1991).
6. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1989) (one-third of all reasonable exemplary
damages collected in civil actions went to state's general fund); FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73(2) (West
Supp. 1993) (Thirty-five percent of a punitive damage award is paid to the Public Medical
Assistance Trust Fund if the cause of action is personal injury or wrongful death; in all other
civil actions, 35% of a punitive damage award is paid into the state's General Revenue Fund.
Florida's statute previously required that 60% of a punitive damage award go to the state. See
FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73(2) (West Supp. 1992). The statute was amended in 1992 and the state
portion was reduced to 35%.); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1991) (75% of
punitive damage award in products liability cases went to Fiscal Division of the Department of
Administrative Services); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991)
(trial court has discretion to determine how much of punitive damage award will be
apportioned to state); IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (1987) (if defendant's conduct was directed
specifically at plaintiff, then the plaintiff collects the full amount of damages awarded by the
jury; if defendant's conduct was not directed specifically at plaintiff, then at least 75% of
punitive damage award is paid into a civil reparations trust fund); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3402(e) (Supp. 1990) (50% of punitive damages in medical malpractice case is payable into
State Health Care Stabilization Fund); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (Vernon 1988) (50% of
punitive damages in tort action is payable into state's Tort Victims' Compensation Fund); OR.
REV. STAT. § 18.540 (Supp. 1992) (50% of punitive damage award is payable into state's
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (50% of
any punitive damage award over $20,000 is payable into state's General Fund).
7. To date, only four courts have heard direct challenges to the constitutional validity of
these statutes. See Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (upholding
IOWA CODE § 668A.1(2)); McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga.
1990) (striking down GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2)); Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818
P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (striking down COLO. STAT. § 13-21-102(4)); Gordon v. State, 608 So.
2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (upholding FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73(2), which, at the time the cause of action
arose, apportioned 60% of a punitive damage award to the state).
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Amendments of the United States Constitution.' Recent United
States Supreme Court decisions clearly uphold the awarding of puni-
tive damages against constitutional challenges by defendants; 9 how-
ever, the Court has never been presented with the issue of whether a
plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property right to collect a full
punitive damage award. Although the Florida Supreme Court held
that there is no such right,"° the Supreme Court of Colorado"1
decided that such an extraction statute constitutes an unconstitutional
taking of private property.
This Comment critically explores the rationales and implications
of state extraction statutes. Part II cautions that state extraction stat-
utes must be viewed skeptically as an element of the highly politicized
tort reform movement. Part III demonstrates that, contrary to the
claims of the defenders of state extraction statutes, these statutes
undermine, rather than further, the goals of punitive damages. Part
IV analyzes recent United States Supreme Court cases regarding
punitive damages and their impact upon state extraction statutes.
The Court's strong support for the traditional common law regime of
punitive damages suggests that the Court would look critically upon a
statute that undermines this tradition in favor of a system that allo-
cates funds to the state. Part V explores the takings issue and estab-
lishes that a plaintiff has a constitutionally protected property right in
a full punitive damage award as set by the jury and approved by the
court as reasonable. This Comment further suggests that notions of
fairness and justice, which are the fundamental principles of the Tak-
ings Clause, are the proper focus of the takings inquiry as applied to
state extraction statutes. Application of Supreme Court takings cases
and notions of fairness and justice suggest that a state extraction stat-
ute constitutes an unconstitutional taking unless it provides a quid
pro quo for the limitation on recovery or is reasonably related to the
costs incurred by the state in administering the civil justice system for
the particular litigation before the court. Part VI concludes that cur-
rent state extraction statutes effect unconstitutional takings and sug-
8. The Fifth Amendment of the United State Constitution, in pertinent part, states: "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 160 (1980). Of the four courts that have heard challenges to state extraction statutes, only
Kirk directly addressed the takings issue.
9. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, III S. Ct. 1032 (1991); Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 U.S. 238
(1984).
10. See Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802.
11. See Kirk, 818 P.2d at 273.
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gests guidelines for reformulating these statutes to comport with the
Takings Clause.
II. THE MOVEMENT TO REFORM PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The effort to reform the traditional regime of punitive damages is
only one component of the general effort of the past decade to reform
the American tort system. 12 This tort reform crusade is a legislative
response to the fear that tort liability has expanded too far.13 Critics
have attacked punitive damages in particular as an unregulated and
growing menace to our economy and our civil justice system.14 These
critics contend that punitive damage awards have increased rapidly in
size and frequency since the 1970s. " Critics emphasize the threat cre-
ated to small- and medium-sized businesses by enormous damage
awards and the temptation these large awards create for potential
plaintiffs and their attorneys to bring frivolous law suits. 6
A growing number of legal scholars question the existence of a
punitive damage crisis. They maintain that punitive damages are not
routinely awarded and are moderate in amount when given. 7 These
12. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
1-2 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988); Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 3; Komesar, supra note 3,
at 23, 25-26. Other components of the tort reform movement include statutes that cap
damages or modify attorney fees and statutes that narrow tort liability by limiting particular
claims, broadening defenses, and limiting joint and several tort liability. KEETON ET AL.,
supra, at 1-2 (Supp. 1988).
13. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, at 1 (Supp. 1988).
14. MINZER ET AL., supra note 5, § 40.03, at 40-7.
15. See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 4 & n.ll.
16. MINZER ET AL., supra note 5, § 40.03, at 40-7.
17. See Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443,
459 (1987) ("punitive damage awards remain rare"); Stephen D. Sugarman, Taking Advantage
of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 350 (1987) (noting that only "a very small percentage
of cases attract punitive damages"). A study of state trial court judgments from a variety of
regions across the country established a pattern indicating that: (1) punitive damages are not
routinely awarded; (2) dollar amounts of punitive damage awards are not staggering; and (3)
jury awards of punitive damages are infrequent and in modest dollar amounts. Daniels &
Martin, supra note 1, at 43. Furthermore, a review of data regarding awards of punitive
damages in accident and personal injury cases leads to the conclusion that punitive damages
are not an "overwhelming concern" in accident cases and are "uncommonly rare" in personal
injury cases. Galligan, supra note 1, at 78-79. Even when punitive damages are granted by the
jury, the judge may reduce or even overturn the jury's assessment of punitive damages if she
deems it to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Dazzling Verdicts Can Face Reversal, NAT'L L. J., Jan.
20, 1992, at S4 (providing an overview of cases from 1990 and 1991 in which large punitive
damage awards have been overturned or set aside). The considerable reduction or complete
reversal of punitive damage awards granted by juries in 1991 may be attributable to the
Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032
(1991). Reductions Often Slash Significant Jury Awards, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 20, 1992, at Si5. In
Haslip, the Supreme Court approved the common law tradition of juries assessing punitive
damages, but cautioned that reasonableness of the amount and guidance from the court should
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scholars attribute the perceived punitive damage crisis to a highly
politicized power struggle between interest groups during the 1980s.II
Insurance and business groups caught the attention of the Reagan
administration.' 9 This resulted in legislative reforms in over half the
states. 21 It is no coincidence that virtually all of this tort reform legis-
lation heavily favors defendants. 21 Consumer groups were overpow-
ered by wealthy business groups and were most adversely affected by
the tort reforms.22
Critics of tort reform charge that reformers paint an exaggerated
picture of an out-of-control punitive damage system by appealing to
the fears and emotions of the public and by distorting the realities.23
First, they note that media attention focuses only on the multi-million
dollar awards and peculiar cases. 24 For example, although the gen-
eral public is apt to hear about the half million dollar punitive damage
award received by a robber when he fell through a skylight, they are
less likely to be told that the "robber" was really a teenage boy who
was never charged and was injured when he fell from a roof that the
"properly enter into the constitutional calculus." Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1043. Some judges have
interpreted Haslip to give judges "greater latitude in striking down what they consider to be
excessive punitives." Reductions Often Slash Significant Jury Awards, supra, at S15. For
further discussion of Haslip, see infra notes 83-85, 91-96 and accompanying text.
18. Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 10-11; Sugarman, supra note 17, at 329, 338; see
also Andrew Blum, Debate Still Rages on Torts, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 1. Referring to
the perceived tort crisis, Blum states that "Vice President Dan Quayle took a then-dense,
minutae-filled issue and made it political fodder and front page news by attacking lawyers and
the legal system." Id. The Senate's recent rejection of a bill that sought to "limit the ability of
consumers to collect punitive damages" supports the position of critics of the punitive damage
crisis and consumer groups, which contended that "there was little evidence that juries had
awarded plaintiffs unreasonable damages in such suits." Senate Kills Liability Limit, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1992, at CIO. This article describes the power struggle between
manufacturers and other business groups, who lobbied for ten years to pass this liability
limitation, and consumer groups, who opposed the limitation. Id; see also infra notes 71-76
and accompanying text.
19. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 10-11, 24-26; Sugarman, supra note 17, at 329.
20. Over half the states have instituted some form of punitive damage reform legislation.
This legislation ranges from a change in the burden of proof needed to establish punitive
damages to a complete abolition of punitive damages. JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J.
KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 21.12 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
21. Sugarman, supra note 17, at 329, 350.
22. Id.; Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 10-11.
23. See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 20; Sugarman, supra note 17, at 333; see
also Blum, supra note 18. Blum argues that "[tihe [tort reform] debate has gotten clouded -
with anecdotes, horror stories and subsequent denials. The public is getting a mixed message."
Id. Blum concludes that opponents of tort reform may be right in their assertion that their has
been no litigation explosion or tort crisis. Other authors note that exaggeration often fuels the
debate. See, e.g., Gail Diane Cox, Tort Tales Lash Back, NAT'L L. J., August 3, 1992, at 1.
Cox recounts stories of tort victims, claiming that "[o]utrageous anecdotes fueled tort reform,
but it's a game two can play." Id.
24. Abel, supra note 17, at 445; Sugarman, supra note 17, at 336-37.
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defendant school district knew was dangerous.25 The more common
cases where no punitive damages are awarded also rarely make the
headlines. 26 "Courts should not be taken in by parades of horribles or
the bandwagon of commentators who present only part of the institu-
tional picture."27
Second, critics contend that the conclusions reached by the
reformers are based upon a scanty data base and questionable inter-
pretations of the statistics.2' The release of "press kits" presenting
statistics of reformers in a "scientific format" lent an illusion of objec-
tivity to the reformers' contentions; however, the reformers neither
provided contextual information nor an explanation of the data base
source or the method of analysis. 29 The reformers relied upon the
data "to create a state of mind in the furtherance of a political agenda
and should be interpreted accordingly."3 In fact, data from a recent
study on the frequency and magnitude of punitive damages shows
that punitive damage awards are indeed rare in frequency and moder-
ate in amount.3" This particular study is significant because it
included data from Cook County, Illinois, the same county from
which most reformers derived their statistics to "prove" the existence
of a punitive damage crisis. 32 Although the researchers on both sides
studied the same geographical region for the same time periods, their
conclusions drastically contradicted each other.
The debate over whether or not a punitive damage crisis truly
exists is attributable to more than the intentional skewing of statistics.
25. Sugarman, supra note 17, at 337 & n.45.
26. Abel, supra note 17, at 445.
27. Komesar, supra note 3, at 77.
28. Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 4. For example, heavy criticism has been directed
at the mode of data analysis used by reformers to support their contention that the dollar
amount of punitive damages has skyrocketed. Reformers use the mean of punitive damage
awards, rather than the median. Use of the median measure is generally preferred when, as is
the case with punitive damages, the data contains several extreme values. The median
represents the "middle" figure when the awards are listed in order from lowest to highest. On
the other hand, use of the mean (or mathematical average) skews the result up towards the
high end because the mean is sensitive to extreme values. Thus, use of the mean supports the
reformers' claim of skyrocketing punitive damage awards, while use of the more appropriate
median does not. Id. at 39-42.
29. See id. at 14-28.
30. Id. at 27.
31. Id. at 43. The authors' conclusions were derived from an extensive study of trial court
judgments from a variety of regions across the nation. The data analyzed was from the same
time period as that of the research of the reformers, most notably presented in a report and
updates by the Department of Justices' Tort Policy Working Group during the Reagan
administration. The authors' impressive study also included data from Cook County, Illinois,
which was the focus of the Working Group's research data. Id. at 36, 43.
32. Id. at 36.
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A viable explanation for the divergent conclusions may be the exist-
ence of several distinct types of tort litigation, each with its own par-
ticular legal dynamics.33 Misconceptions result when a researcher
either looks at the system as a whole and ignores distinct subgroups or
when the researcher assumes that trends in one area generalize to
other areas. 34 For example, large punitive damage awards resulting
from serious injury and "high stakes" litigation, such as medical mal-
practice, may be improperly generalized to the more common "ordi-
nary accident litigation," thereby creating an illusion of a widespread
and unpredictable punitive damage crisis. 35 Although this insight
does not conclusively establish the absence of a genuine crisis, it does
counsel skepticism in response to the reformers' insinuations of a
nationwide, out-of-control crisis.
Nevertheless, state legislatures responded to the perceived crisis.
Nine states passed state extraction statutes that apportioned a per-
centage of a punitive damage award to the state. Two of these stat-
utes were struck down and two were upheld. The remaining statutes
have not yet been challenged. 36  The amount of the punitive damage
award extracted ranges from one-third to seventy-five percent.37 All
of these statutes are vague as to the specific use of the collected money
or the precise purpose of the benefitted state funds. Although the
manner in which the money is to be directed to the state fund is not
clear in most of these statutes, the general trend indicates that it is the
function of the court to order the appropriate amount to be paid to
the designated state fund.38
III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: Do STATE EXTRACTION
STATUTES FURTHER THE GOALS OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES?
The policy rationales underlying the theory of punitive damages
provide much of the substance for the defense of the state extraction
33. Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil
Justice Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 478, 480 (1987).
34. Id. at 493; see also Daniels & Martin, supra note 1, at 27 (expressing concern over the
tendency of reformers to generalize from limited case studies to nationwide trends).
35. Hensler, supra note 33, at 495.
36. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73(2) (West Supp. 1993) (clerk of the court must send
copy of jury verdict to State Treasurer and court shall order percentage of award to state); GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-12-5. l(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1991) (apportionment of award to state is duty of
clerk of court); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (trial court
shall apportion award to state fund); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (Vernon 1988) (circuit clerk
to notify attorney general).
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statutes. Therefore, these factors must be considered when examining
the validity of these statutes.
A. Deterrence and Punishment
Traditionally, courts have awarded punitive damages to plaintiffs
as a form of recovery beyond compensatory damages when the
defendant has engaged in behavior that is intentional, malicious or
outrageous. 39 The rationales most often asserted to justify punitive
damages are deterrence and punishment.' The imposition of puni-
tive damages punishes the defendant for committing some socially
undesirable act, while discouraging similar conduct in the future by
the defendant and others.
These are the precise policy considerations upon which the Flor-
ida Supreme Court relied in upholding Florida's extraction statute in
Gordon v. State.4' At the time the cause of action arose, chapter
768.73 of the Florida Statutes provided for the payment of forty per-
cent of a punitive damage award to the plaintiff and sixty percent to
the state.42 Because the defendant must still pay the full amount of
the punitive damage award, the provisions of the statute appear not to
reduce the level of punishment and deterrence that the defendant
would receive were the money to go to the claimant rather than the
state. This appearance is illusory, however, because the attainment of
deterrence and punishment depends on the success of other goals of
punitive damages that are directly impaired by the apportionment of a
percentage of a punitive damage award to the state.
Although deterrence and punishment are the most commonly
cited justifications for punitive damages, many legal scholars and
courts also recognize other valid goals of punitive damages. These
goals include providing an incentive for tort victims to sue by
rewarding successful plaintiffs with punitive damages4 3 and compen-
sating tort victims for expenses or injuries not fully recoverable under
39. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 2; James D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages.: State
Extraction Practice is Subject to Eighth Amendment Limitation, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 119, 120
(1990).
40. MINZER ET AL., supra note 5, § 40.01, at 40-5; Galligan, supra note 1, at 27.
41. 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992).
42. See FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73(2) (Supp. 1986). The statute was recently amended to
reduce the state's portion to 35% and increase the plaintiff's portion to 65%. See FLA. STAT.
ch. 768.73(2) (West Supp. 1993).
43. See, e.g., MINZER ET AL., supra note 5, § 40.12[2], at 40-46 to 40-47; Richard C.
Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 70 (1985-86). At least six highest state courts have explicitly
recognized this incentive as a proper role for punitive damages. MINZER ET AL., supra note 5,
§ 40.12[2] at 40-46 n.51.
[Vol. 47:437
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compensatory damages." Although the Gordon court and other pro-
ponents of punitive damage reform have ignored or rejected these sec-
ondary goals, their existence must be acknowledged in analyzing the
soundness of state extraction statutes because the diminution of these
secondary goals threatens the attainment of punishment and deter-
rence, the primary goals upon which our punitive damage system is
based.45
B. Incentive to Sue
The Gordon court's policy reasoning echoes the rhetoric of the
tort reformers. The court looked to the legislative objectives behind
Florida's state extraction statute to find that one of its purposes was to
"discourage punitive damage claims by making them less remunera-
tive to the claimant and the claimant's attorney."46 A legislative
determination that enactment of a statute was necessary for this pur-
pose presupposes a tort crisis where plaintiffs and their attorneys are
greedy wealth seekers who put forth frivolous claims in an effort to
receive a windfall in punitive damages. This plays right into the
hands of the punitive damage reformers." As previously discussed,
this type of reasoning must be viewed skeptically in light of the highly
politicized debate over punitive damages. Studies report that tort vic-
tims in fact underclaim.48 Societal pressures discourage tort victims
44. See, e.g., GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 20, § 4.02 (noting that in several states the
practice of awarding punitive damages is actually compensatory in nature, even though stated
policy may only recognize punishment and deterrence rationales). Several states explicitly
recognize punitive damages as a means of making plaintiff whole financially or emotionally due
to the extreme offensiveness of the injurer's behavior. See MINZER ET AL., supra note 5,
§ 40.06, at 40-19 to 40-20, § 40-12, at 40-37, § 40.12[3], at 40-47 to 40-48. In addition, several
states recognize compensation as a reason to grant punitive damages. See Tina Hughes,
Current Constitutional Challenges to the Administration of Punitive Damages, 14 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 421, 426 (1989),
45. Although the Supreme Court recently stated that deterrence and retribution are
reasons for imposing punitive damages, the Court did not suggest that these are the only
permissible goals. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, III S. Ct. 1032, 1044 (1991);
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989). The Court simply
recognized the arguments advanced by the states in each of these cases. The Court accorded a
great amount of deference to our strong history and tradition of allowing and assessing
punitive damages. Haslip, III S. Ct. at 1041-44; Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 273-76.
46. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992).
47. For example, reformers insinuate that claimants are cheating the system in a manner
analogous to that of "welfare cheats." See Abel, supra note 17, at 447. The reformers'
campaign is founded on images of promoting the public good. This image is in sharp contrast
to the alleged greed of the injured claimants and their attorneys. See Daniels & Martin, supra
note 1, at 21.
48. Abel, supra note 17, at 448-450; see also Komesar, supra note 3, at 62 (noting that the
number of successful claims by victims of product and service accidents is significantly lower
than the number of injuries arising from such accidents).
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from bringing suit; therefore, potential claimants are generally reluc-
tant to sue, rather than overeager. 49 As one reform critic explains,
"successful tort claims do not create liability costs, they merely shift
them from victims to tortfeasors. It is the tortfeasors who create lia-
bility costs by injuring victims. . . . If liability costs are high, it is
because injuries are frequent and serious."50
In contrast to our state-controlled criminal justice system, pri-
vate actors drive our civil tort system.5 ' The tort system depends
upon tort victims to bring suit against their injurers. In a very real
sense, plaintiffs are asked to play the role of private prosecutors.5 2
"The system depends on these actors to bring and prosecute cases,
and if they do not act, the system will not function. To an appreciable
extent, the incentives for this action lie in the expected damage
awards."53 Without the incentive of punitive damages, the "emo-
tional and financial stress" of suing may prevent many tort victims
from bringing suit.54
Society should encourage lawsuits against those who injure
others or commit socially undesirable acts because such suits are soci-
ety's primary vehicle for enforcing legal and community norms and
deterring wrongdoers.55 If the judicial system discourages a potential
plaintiff from suing, the tortfeasor will not be deterred from engaging
in the harmful activity because he will not be made to pay for his
actions. 56 Thus, it is particularly important to protect punitive dam-
ages when actual damages are nominal because this is precisely when
the claimant must have an incentive to bring such "petty outrages
into court."' 57 This argument is especially strong where many are
injured, but the harm to each is slight. If there is no incentive for the
49. Abel, supra note 17, at 448-50. Abel rejects the contention that many lawsuits are
frivolous and unnecessary. Id. at 465.
50. Id. at 446.
51. Komesar, supra note 3, at 27.
52. Id.; Pamela B. Fort et al., Florida's Tort Reform: Response to a Persistent Problem, 14
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 519, 525 (1986).
53. Komesar, supra note 3, at 27.
54. Ausness, supra note 43, at 75.
55. Id. at 5; MINZER ET AL., supra note 5, § 40.12[2], at 40-46 to 40-47; Abel, supra note
17, at 460.
56. Underclaiming impairs the deterrence effect and encourages unreasonable risk taking
by potential tortfeasors. See Abel, supra note 17, at 447.
57. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 2. The argument may be made that statutes limiting
punitive damages to an amount equal to or less than a given multiple of compensatory
damages also defeat the incentive to sue when actual damages are nominal. For example, FLA.
STAT. ch. 768.73(l)(a) (West Supp. 1993) provides that punitive damages may not exceed
three times the amount of compensatory damages. Although such statutes may reduce the
incentive to sue for a tort victim with nominal damages, these statutes nonetheless provide an
incentive. Even where damages are only nominal, three times that amount may be sufficient to
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injured to sue, the injurer will continue to harm many because it is
economically efficient. He is not compelled to take into account all
the costs of his conduct, such as defending a lawsuit and paying dam-
ages.58 The tortfeasor is not punished and future tortfeasors will not
be deterred. Therefore, state extraction statutes not only greatly mini-
mize an injured victim's incentive to sue, but they also indirectly
undermine the role of punitive damages in our civil justice system by
largely defeating the roles of punishment and deterrence.
C. Compensation
Historically, punitive damages compensated an injured party for
unrecoverable damages.5 9 Many such harms are now compensable
under an enlarged concept of actual damages. Yet, actual damages
alone still significantly undercompensate the plaintiff for serious inju-
ries in many instances.' Therefore, compensation survives as an
important justification for punitive damages. 61 The compensation
theory encompasses two components: compensation for litigation
related expenses and compensation for the additional mental anguish
caused by the malicious nature of the defendant's actions.
As a result of our civil litigation system's method of assessing
costs and its policy not to award attorney's fees, "[m]ost successful
claimants incur a loss."62 Typically, more than one-third of a plain-
tiff's recovery goes to pay attorney's fees, "usually leav[ing] the victim
in worse financial condition than before his injury. 63 Punitive dam-
ages serve an important function in easing the burden associated with
the great deal of money and effort expended in bringing a law suit."
Courts and legal scholars widely recognize that compensation for
degradation and humiliation is a valid reason for granting an injured
plaintiff punitive damages. Malicious conduct by injurers creates a
strong sense of violation and outrage within victims. 65 The manner in
which a tortfeasor inflicts an injury generates the additional harm that
compensate the tort victim for expenses or injuries not covered by a compensatory damage
award. See discussion infra part III.C.
58. Galligan, supra note 1, at 39.
59. Id. at 39 n.146.
60. Komesar, supra note 3, at 62-63.
61. Hughes, supra note 44, at 423-25. In fact, some states still explicitly recognize
compensation as the sole, or one of several, reasons to allow punitive damages. GHIARDI &
KIRCHER, supra note 20, Table 4-1; MINZER ET AL., supra note 5, § 40.12[3], at 40-47 to 40-
49.
62. GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 20, § 21.17.
63. Ausness, supra note 43, at 68.
64. Id. at 67-68.
65. Abel, supra note 17, at 455.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
punitive damages target. Punitive damages play an important role in
"assuaging the enormous outrage victims may legitimately feel when
they are deliberately injured."66 Receipt of punitive damages restores
the plaintiff's peace of mind6 7 and emotional equilibrium, 68 giving the
injured plaintiff a sense of justice.69
To ignore the compensatory aspects of punitive damages is to
assume that the injured party is being fully compensated in the cur-
rent compensatory damages system. The above discussion indicates
serious flaws in this assumption. Punitive damages compensate for
injuries that fall through the cracks of the compensatory damages sys-
tem. By making punitive damage claims "less remunerative to the
claimant,"' 70 the state extraction statutes frustrate this compensatory
function of punitive damages. In addition, by failing to recognize the
compensatory function of punitive damages, these statutes necessarily
fail to acknowledge the role that punitive damages play in an injured
party's decision to bring suit. Furthermore, because the primary
goals of punitive damages, punishment and deterrence, will not be
fully realized if plaintiffs have a diminished incentive to bring suit
against an egregious injurer, the state extraction statutes undermine
the foundation of our punitive damage tradition.
D. Revenue for the State and Viability of Businesses
When the traditional rationales for punitive damages fail to jus-
tify state extraction statutes, the highly politicized motives behind
these statutes are revealed. For example, in McBride v. General
Motors Corp. ,71 the state admitted that its interest in collecting a por-
tion of a punitive damage award was to promote the viability of busi-
nesses in the state and to generate revenue, "even though the business
may have erred in one of its products. ' 72 The McBride court found
66. Sugarman, supra note 17, at 360; see also Abel, supra note 17, at 455 (recognizing the
need to compensate victims for the sense of outrage and violation experienced as a result of
malicious actions).
67. Ausness, supra note 43, at 39.
68. Hughes, supra note 44, at 425; see also Ausness, supra note 43, at 68.
69. Abel, supra note 17, at 456.
70. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992).
71. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
72. Id. at 1568. The court quoted the following from the State's Brief:
The state interest in question is the viability of Georgia businesses continuing
their operation and continuing to bring income to the State of Georgia even
though the business may have erred in one of its products.... The Act rationally
furthers another governmental interest of generating revenue. [R]evenue will
come directly from 75 percent of the award for punitive damages authorized
under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2).
Id. at 1568.
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that Georgia's extraction statute was "a thinly disguised arbitrary
restraint in favor of business seeking to deter punitive damage actions
against egregious business practices by reducing incentives for injured
plaintiffs to take action to punish and deter such practices."' 3 The
court based its reasoning for this conclusion upon a distinction that
Georgia's statute made between punitive damages awarded for prod-
ucts liability claims and those awarded for non-products liability
claims. In a products liability case, twenty-five percent of the award
was given to the plaintiff while the remaining seventy-five percent of
the award went to the state. However, in a non-products liability tort
case, the plaintiff retained one-hundred percent of a punitive damage
award.74 This distinction reveals that the true intent of this state
extraction statute was the protection of businesses, which would suffer
more from product liability suits than from non-product liability tort
suits.
Although the direct challenges to other state extraction statutes
have not clearly delineated what interests those states assert in collect-
ing a portion of a punitive damage award," it is rational to assume
that these other states had motives similar to those of Georgia in pass-
ing their respective statutes. The research and commentary of the
tort reform critics bolster this view that the motives underlying state
extraction statutes are highly politicized and strongly favor busi-
73. Id. at 1570. The Supreme Court of Colorado reached a similar conclusion in finding
that Colorado's state extraction statute evidenced no reasonable relationship between the
state's alleged goal of punishment and deterrence and the forced contribution imposed upon
the injured plaintiff. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991). In Gordon,
the dissent adopted this position of the Kirk court. 608 So. 2d at 803 (Shaw, J., concurring and
dissenting); see also infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
74. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1569.
75. See Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991); Kirk v. Denver
Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991); Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992). In
Kirk and Gordon, the courts suggested possible state interests, including punishing the
tortfeasor, deterring future harm and discouraging punitive damage claims. The Kirk court
concluded that statutorily allocating a portion of a plaintiff's punitive damage award to the
state did not reasonably relate to "any arguable [state] goal" of punishment or deterrence.
Rather, the "statute's obvious purpose was to produce revenue for the state general fund." 818
P.2d at 270. In contrast to Kirk, the Gordon court concluded that there was a rational
relationship between the state extraction statute and possible state interests in deterrence and
discouraging punitive damage claims. 608 So. 2d at 802. However the Gordon court failed to
explain how the forced contribution from the plaintiff promoted the state's alleged interest in
deterrence. See 608 So. 2d at 803 (Shaw, J., concurring and dissenting). Furthermore, the
legitimacy of the goal of discouraging punitive damage claims should be viewed skeptically in
light of the politicization of the tort reform movement. See supra notes 46-50 and
accompanying text. In fact, the two state interests espoused by the Gordon court appear to be
at odds with each other. Discouraging punitive damage claims diminishes the incentive for an
injured party to sue. Therefore, the tortfeasor is not punished and future tortfeasors will not
be deterred. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
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nesses. 6 This suggests again that extraction statutes do not promote
the goals of punitive damages, but rather are aimed at generating rev-
enue for the state and discouraging plaintiffs from bringing suit.
IV. ASSESSING THE SUPREME COURT'S POSITION ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE
EXTRACTION STATUTES
United States Supreme Court cases spanning the past several
decades show strong support for the regime of punitive damages. In
1975, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts," the Court reiterated its tradi-
tional commitment to allow punitive damages by noting that "the
Constitution presents no general bar to the assessment of punitive
damages in a civil case."' 78 The Court subsequently maintained this
position when faced with specific constitutional challenges by defend-
ants against the imposition of punitive damages. 79 The Court never
directly addressed a plaintiff's right to receive the full amount of a
punitive damage award, as set by the trier of fact. Yet, the spirit of
the Court's decisions leads one to conclude that the Court would be
likely to uphold this right in cases where the award is neither exces-
sive nor the product of passion or prejudice.
In Curtis, public figures brought a libel suit and were awarded
punitive damages.8" The defense contended that punitive damages
were not proper in a libel suit because "an award of general damages
compensates for any possible pecuniary and intangible harm."8 The
Court rejected this argument and recognized that punitive damages
may have a compensatory function in restoring a plaintiff's dignity. 2
Similarly, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,s3 the Court
recently approved a method of determining punitive damages that
allows the fact finder to consider the effect of the defendant's conduct
upon the plaintiff, rather than limiting the inquiry to the nature of
76. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para.
2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991). The Historical and Practice Notes referring to this
extraction statute state that its primary purpose is to discourage plaintiffs from seeking
punitive damages, thereby remedying the problem of increased cost and decreased availability
of liability insurance.
77. 388 U.S. 130 (1967), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967), overruled on other grounds by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
78. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 159.
79. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, III S. Ct. 1032 (1991) (upholding punitive
damages against due process challenge); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257 (1989) (upholding punitive damages against excessive fines challenge).
80. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 133-39.
81. Id. at 160.
82. Id. at 160-61.
83. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
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defendant's conduct.84 In assessing the constitutional validity of
punitive damages, the Haslip Court determined the propriety of look-
ing beyond the punishment and deterrence justifications of punitive
damages.85 Taken together, these cases show that the Court's vision
of punitive damages is broad. Therefore, the Court would be likely to
reject the tort reformers' argument that punitive damages are always
an undeserved windfall to the plaintiff.
In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 6
Justice Stewart postulated a protectable, state-created Fifth Amend-
ment property right in the "recover[y] [of] full compensation for tort
injuries."87 Justice Stewart maintained that the government's limita-
tion on a plaintiff's ability to fully recover for a tort injury infringes
upon this property right.88 The district court in McBride v. General
Motors Corp. 8 9 found this reasoning persuasive in striking down Geor-
gia's state extraction statute. The McBride court logically assumed
that "full compensation" encompassed punitive damages as well as
compensatory damages and noted that "adequate remedies for per-
sons injured have included both compensatory and punitive damages
throughout the history of the common law." 90
The Supreme Court also called upon this rich tradition of grant-
ing punitive damages in the recent case of Pacific Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Haslip.9' Haslip involved a due process challenge to the
common law tradition of jury determination of punitive damages.
The Court considered the argument that unlimited jury discretion
may result in excessive awards and a windfall to the plaintiff.92 How-
ever, the Court "[could] not say that the common-law method for
assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny due pro-
cess and be per se unconstitutional."93 The Court reasoned that the
assessment of how much a plaintiff will receive in punitive damages
84. Id. at 1045.
85. Id. at 1044 (noting that the state's goals of retribution and deterrence alone do not
provide answer to due process challenge against punitive damages); see also Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989) (finding that state's goals of
punishment and deterrence are not enough to invoke Excessive Fines Clause against punitive
damages in civil litigation between private parties).
86. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
87. Id. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
90. Id. at 1573-74, 1576.
91. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255
(1984) ("Punitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law.").
92. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1040.
93. Id. at 1043.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
has always been the function of the jury or trier of fact.94 Absent a
showing of unreasonableness or inadequate instruction to the jury, the
jury has final discretion. 95
A traditional practice, entrenched in the common law of most
jurisdictions across the nation for hundreds of years, requires a strong
constitutional mandate to uproot it.96 Given the controversy over the
existence of a punitive damage crisis and the need, for massive tort
reforms, the Supreme Court would probably scrutinize carefully a
state extraction statute that undermines the jury's role in granting
punitive damages to the plaintiff and emasculates a form of recovery
that is deeply rooted in our civil justice system.
Although many states have some form of legislation that limits
punitive damages, common law awards of punitive damages are still
granted in most states.97 Forty-six states allow punitive damages at
common law, 98 including the nine states that have or had extraction
statutes.9 9  Only two states-Louisiana and Massachusetts-allow
punitive damages by statute only."o To allow punitive damages only
by statute means that they may not be granted "unless it be for some
particular wrong for which a statute expressly authorizes the imposi-
tion of such a penalty."'' The type of statute that restricts the
awarding of punitive damages to certain specified conduct that gave
rise to the cause of action differs from a statute that merely establishes
the level of maliciousness necessary for the imposition of punitive
damages. For example, in Colorado, punitive damages are allowed
under the common law. Nonetheless, Colorado's punitive damage
statute requires that the injured party show the defendant's tort was
accompanied by "fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct ' 1°2 as
94. Id. at 1042.
95. Id. at 1042-43; see also infra note 107 and accompanying text. One author notes that
"[a]ccording to conventional wisdom, the jury is thought to function as the community's
conscience, and its reaction of shock and outrage to the defendant's conduct when punitive
damages are awarded is presumably an accurate reflection of societal values." Ausness, supra
note 43, at 96.
96. Haslip, 11I S. Ct. at 1043.
97. See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 20, Table 4-1.
98. Id. The District of Columbia also allows punitive damages by common law. Id.
99. See supra note 6.
100. See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 20, Table 4-1. Nebraska and Washington are
the only states that neither allow punitive damages at common law nor by statute. See id.
101. Id. § 4.09 (emphasis added) (quoting McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 143 So.
383, 385-86 (La. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932)). "An example of a statutory
allowance of punitive damages [is] that anyone who wilfully and intentionally destroys or
removes any trees growing or lying on the land of another without the permission of the owner
shall be liable for [punitive damages]." Id. § 4.09.
102. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(l)(a) (1989). A careful reading of Florida's statute
reveals that similar restrictions are placed upon statutory limitations to punitive damages
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a prerequisite to a punitive damage award.
The distinction between statutory and common law allowance of
punitive damages exposes a weakness in the argument of state extrac-
tion proponents that "the legislature is free to condition a claim for
[punitive] damages which is allowed only pursuant to a statutory
grant."103 This was the position espoused by the dissent in Kirk v.
Denver Publishing Co., in which the majority struck down Colo-
rado's state extraction statute. Similarly, in upholding Florida's state
extraction statute, the majority in Gordon v. State asserted that the
"allowance of punitive damages is based entirely upon considerations
of public policy ... [and therefore the legislature] may place condi-
tions upon such a recovery or even abolish it altogether."10 5 These
rather than grants of punitive damages. See FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73(l)(a) (West Supp. 1993).
Under Florida's system, statutory limitations upon punitive damages are invoked "[i]n any
civil action based on negligence, strict liability, products liability, misconduct in commercial
transactions, professional liability, or breach of warranty, and involving willful, wanton, or
gross misconduct." Id. Florida's earlier statute, upon which Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800
(Fla. 1992), was based, read substantially the same in pertinent part. See FLA. STAT. ch.
768.73 (Supp. 1986). The Gordon appellate court apparently misread the statute when it
reasoned that "where any existing statute provides that funds recovered under it are subject to
a prior claim, a party cannot thereafter obtain a vested right to that claim." Gordon v. State,
585 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), aff'd, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992). In fact, the only
apparent condition upon a grant of punitive damages is that there be a "reasonable basis for
recovery of such damages." FLA. STAT. ch. 768.72 (West Supp. 1993). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit shares this interpretation. In Scheidt v. Klein, the
Tenth Circuit noted that chapter 768.73(1) of the Florida Statutes "restricts the permissible
amount of punitive damages only in 'civil action[s] based on negligence, strict liability,
products liability, misconduct in commercial transactions, professional liability, or breach of
warranty.'" Scheidt v. Klein, 956 F.2d 963, 970 (10th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
103. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 274-75 (Colo. 1991) (Rovira, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). Even if this were true, property rights may attach to state
created benefits for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 745 (1964). Among other constitutional
protections of property, Reich suggests that governmental benefits be afforded protection
against takings without just compensation. Id. at 745. Although state legislatures determine
what benefits will be distributed by the state, it is the role of the courts to decide if a benefit has
sufficient constitutional protection. See Peter N. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme
Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 CAL. L. REV. 146, 146 (1983). Furthermore,
constitutional challenges to the elimination of statutory entitlements cannot be settled by
resort to the argument that such "benefits" are merely a privilege. Rather a protectable
property right may attach to such entitlements. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
& n.8 (1970).
104. 818 P.2d at 274-75.
105. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801 (quoting Gordon, 585 So. 2d at 1035-36). A similar
argument may be made that because the statute was in place before the cause of action arose,
the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation in recovering the full amount of punitive damages
as awarded by the jury. However, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987), the Supreme Court did not find this type of argument dispositive. In that case, a
regulation, which required the Nollans to provide an easement to the beach upon building on
their property, was in place when the Nollans purchased their property. Therefore, according
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arguments fail to appreciate the distinction between a scheme that
allows punitive damages only by statute and a scheme in which a stat-
ute merely establishes the level of maliciousness required for the
imposition of punitive damages. Whether or not state policy may
allow the state to abolish the common law tradition of punitive dam-
ages altogether is a distinct issue from whether or not the state may
allocate to itself a portion of punitive damages that are allowed under
the common law. "The fact that a legislative body might choose to
eliminate [punitive] damages in civil cases without offending [the
Constitution] is not to say that any restriction whatever on [a punitive
damage] award will pass constitutional muster."' 6 Recent Supreme
Court cases suggest that as long as punitive damages are allowed by
the common law of a state, a constitutionally protected property right
attaches to the jury's reasonable determination of punitive damages so
that the state may not confiscate from the plaintiff a piece of the
award for itself.0 7
A unique situation deserving of constitutional scrutiny is created
whenever the government becomes involved in a civil litigation mat-
ter. In United States v. Halper,08 the Supreme Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause'09 is implicated when the government seeks
punitive damages from a defendant who has already been criminally
prosecuted and punished." 0 However, nothing "precludes a private
party from filing a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that previ-
ously was the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment.""'
This distinction between legitimate private party and governmental
expectations from a civil suit was reinforced in Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 1' 2 In Browning-Ferris, the Supreme Court
denied a private defendant's Excessive Fines' '3 challenge to an award
to the above argument, the Nollans had a reasonable expectation that their property would be
deprived upon building. However, this warning did not prevent the Nollans from receiving
due compensation for the deprivation of their property. Id. at 841-42.
106. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 272; see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032,
1054 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
107. See, e.g., Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1032; Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257 (1989); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
108. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
110. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
111. Id. at 451.
112. 497 U.S. 257 (1989).
113. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed .... ").
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of punitive damages." 4 Browning-Ferris materially differs from
Halper because "[in Halper] the Government was exacting punish-
ment in a civil action, whereas [in Browning-Ferris] the damages were
awarded to a private party."' 1 5
The Supreme Court already has suggested that the apportion-
ment of a percentage of a punitive damage award to the state under a
state extraction statute would violate the Excessive Fines Clause." 6
When "some governmental entity is seeking to reap the benefits of a
monetary sanction"'" 7 in a private civil suit, governmental abuse can
be effectuated surreptitiously. These concerns indicate that the
Supreme Court would look critically upon the allocation of a portion
of a private damage award to the state.
V. DOES THE ALLOCATION OF A PORTION OF A PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARD TO THE STATE CONSTITUTE AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING?
A. A Plaintiff's Property Right in a Full Punitive Damage Award
The validity of a state extraction statute for the purpose of tak-
ings issues largely turns upon the determination of a plaintiff's prop-
erty rights in a full punitive damage award.
1. DISTINGUISHING THE RIGHT TO COLLECT THE FULL AMOUNT
OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES GRANTED BY THE JURY FROM
THE RIGHT TO HAVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ASSESSED
The general rule in our civil justice system is that the jury, or
judge, as trier of fact, may award punitive damages if certain burdens
of proof are met; however, they are not obligated to do so."18 The jury
"has the final discretion to award these damages and to determine the
amount of the awards."' 1 9 Only where the award is grossly excessive
or there is a showing of prejudice or passion by the jury will the court
reduce an award of punitive damages. 20 Because the awarding of
punitive damages is left to the discretion of the trier of fact, many
courts and commentators have stated that a plaintiff does not have a
114. Browning-Ferris, 497 U.S. at 280.
115. Id. at 275 n.21.
116. Id. at 298-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Id. at 298.
118. Hughes, supra note 44, at 431-32.
119. Id. at 432; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 2; MINZER ET AL., supra note 5,
§ 40.11, at 40-32 to 40-33; Fort et al., supra note 52, at 520.
120. Hughes, supra note 44, at 432.
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"right" to punitive damages. 121
Furthermore, whether or not the trier of fact may award punitive
damages at all is typically considered to be the state legislature's
annunciation of public policy.122 Florida's Supreme Court in Gordon
v. State 123 relied upon this type of analysis in upholding Florida's
extraction statute against a due process challenge.1 24 The court rea-
soned that because the decision to allow punitive damages at all lies
within the legislature's discretion, the legislature may condition or
even abolish this form of recovery.12 The court asserted that "[t]he
right to have punitive damages assessed is not property." 126  This
analysis, however, confuses the right to have a jury assess punitive
damages with the plaintiff's right to collect the full amount of a puni-
tive damage award as calculated by the jury and approved by the
court as reasonable. 27 In failing to make this distinction, the Gordon
court avoided the real constitutional issue raised by extraction stat-
utes. Specifically, does the plaintiff have a property interest in a puni-
121. See, e.g., Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 275 (Colo. 1991) (Rovira, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that no vested right in punitive damages exists until final judgment is
entered); Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1992) (finding "no cognizable, protectable
right to the recovery of punitive damages at all") (quoting Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033,
1035 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)); KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 2 (punitive damages are "not a
matter of right").
122. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 274 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting); Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801; see also
GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 20, § 21.17 (noting that some state legislatures have
abolished punitive damages); KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, at 2 (Supp. 1988) (noting that
some states have statutes that abolish or limit the availability of punitive damages).
123. 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992).
124. Id.
125. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801. This reasoning ignores the fact that a statutory benefit may
be considered a right, not merely a state conferred privilege. Taken to its logical conclusion,
this reasoning limits the legislature's discretion to condition or abolish the benefit, even if it is a
statutory creation. See supra note 103.
126. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801 (emphasis added) (quoting Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 414
(Fla. 1950)). Although the Florida Supreme Court formally addressed a due process challenge
in Gordon, the court's analysis of a plaintiff's property right is readily applicable to a takings
challenge. In fact, it is not very clear whether the plaintiff's claim was based on a due process
argument or a takings argument. Although Florida's Third District Court of Appeal applied a
due process analysis, they characterized the plaintiff's claim as an alleged "unconstitutional
'taking' of a property right without due process." Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla.
3d DCA 1991). Thus the court mixed the common terminology of the two causes of action.
This confusion highlights the similarities between the two causes of actions and lends support
to the notion that an analysis of the definition of property rights under a due process analysis is
readily applicable in an attempt to define property rights under a takings analysis.
127. A similar argument was made in Lira v. Davis, 832 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1992). The
Supreme Court of Colorado determined that the terms "assessed" and "awarded" were
distinct. "Damages assessed" was found to refer to the pre-reduction amount of compensatory
damages as set by the jury. "Damages awarded" was found to refer to the post-reduction
amount of compensatory damages after reduction pursuant to Colorado's comparative
negligence statute and pro rata liability statute. Id. at 245.
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tive damage award sufficient to invoke constitutional protection
against a state confiscation where the state allows punitive damages to
be assessed and where the trier of fact sets a punitive damage award
that is approved by the court as a reasonable amount?
2. ESTABLISHING A PROTECTABLE PRE-JUDGMENT PROPERTY
INTEREST IN A JURY'S REASONABLE DETERMINATION OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Two of the four courts presented with challenges to state extrac-
tion statutes determined that a plaintiff does hold a private property
right in an award of punitive damages. 2 In Kirk v. Denver Publish-
ing Co. ,129 the Colorado Supreme Court examined the Colorado stat-
ute, which provided for payment of one-third of punitive damages in
all civil actions into Colorado's general fund. 3 ° The court held that
this state extraction provision constituted an unconstitutional taking
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.13 The court's "con-
clusion derive[d] from the nature of [a punitive] damages award as a
private property right." 132
Kirk, however, represents the easy case. The Colorado statute
specifically denied the state any interest in the punitive damage claim
or the litigation until payment of the damages became due. 3  This
provision allowed the court to safely rest its decision on the grounds
that a vested property right is created by a final judgment because this
is when payment becomes due.' 34  Because the Colorado statute
barred the state from asserting an interest before the entering of a final
judgment, the court easily avoided the more difficult question of
whether a protectable interest attaches to the trier of fact's reasonable
128. See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1576 (M.D. Ga. 1990);
Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 265 (Colo. 1991).
129. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
130. Id. at 263 (examining COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987)). The pertinent
provisions of the 1987 version were identical to those in the 1989 version discussed previously.
See, e.g., supra note 6.
131. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 265.
132. Id.
133. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987) (providing that "[n]othing in this subsection
(4) shall be construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim for [punitive] damages
or in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment becoming due.") Only three of the nine
state extraction statutes-Colorado, Georgia and Missouri-have such a provision, The
Colorado and Georgia statutes have been declared unconstitutional. See McBride v. General
Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990); Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d
262 (Colo. 1991).
134. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 266-67; see also Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (Shaw,
J., concurring and dissenting).
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assessment of punitive damages, regardless of whether the state is
granted an interest before final judgment is entered.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Georgia provided more guidance on this issue when it addressed a
challenge to Georgia's state extraction statute in McBride v. General
Motors Corp.'35 Georgia's state extraction statute provided for pay-
ment of seventy-five percent of any punitive damage award in a prod-
ucts liability case into the state treasury. 36 Georgia's statute, much
like the Colorado statute, provided that the state's rights to the puni-
tive damage award accrued only "upon issuance of judgment."'137 In
McBride, the defendant argued that the plaintiff could not raise a
valid constitutional challenge because no right to punitive damages
vested before the entering of a final judgment. 38 The Georgia court
rejected this rationale because it would immunize from "constitu-
tional challenge [any] legislation affecting tort recovery by a tort vic-
tim.' 39 The court indicated that a plaintiff has a constitutionally
protected property interest in a right of recovery in punitive damages,
even where the plaintiff's interest has not yet become a vested prop-
erty right by means of a final judgment. "0 This interest is analogous
to other future interests, which "the law often treats ... as a presently
vested right."' 14'
As one basis for its conclusion, the McBride court looked to the
history of punitive damages and the tradition of providing an injured
party with a full recovery of damages. 42 The court relied upon the
"rich history of availability of punitive damages at common law." 143
The court's reasoning implied that the strong roots of punitive dam-
ages in our society creates an interest in punitive damages that the
state cannot easily deny by legislative fiat. The court struck down
Georgia's state extraction provision, noting that it "deprive[d] a tort
victim of the right to recover an element of damages which has been so
long and so universally recognized."'" The court noted that the right
135. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
136. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2) (Michie Supp. 1991).
137. Id. "Upon issuance of judgment in such a case, the state shall have all rights due a
judgment creditor .... This paragraph shall not be construed as making the state a party at
interest." Id.
138. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1573.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1517
(1991).
142. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1573-74.
143. Id. at 1573.
144. Id. at 1574 (emphasis added).
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to full recovery includes both compensatory and punitive damages. 14
A plaintiff has the same right to receive an award of punitive damages
as she does an award of compensatory damages. 146  Although the
McBride court was responding to a due process challenge, the founda-
tion it laid for the establishment of a protectable pre-judgment prop-
erty interest in a punitive damage award is readily applicable to a
takings challenge.
The issues raised by state extraction statutes are novel and the
cases few; therefore, it is helpful to consider cases that raise similar
issues involving the right to recover punitive damages after the trier of
fact has set an amount, but before final judgment is rendered. Recent
cases outside the immediate realm of state extraction statutes in a
variety of jurisdictions support the notion of a pre-judgment property
interest in punitive damages. In Smith v. States General Life Insur-
ance Co.,141 the Alabama Supreme Court considered a method of allo-
cating a punitive damage award that parallels that used in state
extraction statutes. Smith involved a medical insurance fraud claim,
where the insurer promised the insured that the policy would no
longer exclude coronary disease after a set time.'48 The jury set puni-
tive damages at $250,000.1"9 The trial court then apportioned one-
half of the punitive damage award to the American Heart Associa-
tion,150 reasoning that the punitive damage award would create a
windfall to the plaintiff who had already been compensated by a com-
pensatory damage award.'51 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama determined that the amount of punitive damages to be awarded
to the plaintiff must be left to the discretion of the jury, unless there is
a showing that the jury's determination was constitutionally
flawed.' 52 The punitive damages set by the jury may not be appor-
tioned to "an entity other than the plaintiff." '153
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1576.
147. 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. 1992).
148. Id. at 1023.
149. Id. at 1022.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1023.
152. Id. at 1025.
153. Id. Justice Shores wrote separately to state her opinion that courts have the authority
to allocate a portion of a punitive damage award to the state's general fund or to any other
fund which, in the court's estimation, promotes justice. Id. at 1025-27 (Shores, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Shores had espoused this view the previous year in
Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Insurance Co., 577 So. 2d 878, 886-87 (1991) (Shores, J.,
concurring specially). Florida's Third District Court of Appeal adopted Justice Shores' Fuller
opinion to uphold Florida's extraction statute in Gordon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1991), aff'd, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992).
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The United States District Court for the District of Kansas also
recognized a property right in the jury's determination of a punitive
damage award in O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc. 54 O'Gilvie
involved the death of a woman from Toxic Shock Syndrome after
using the defendant's product. 55 The jury awarded the plaintiff hus-
band $10,000,000 in punitive damages for the death of his wife.' 5 6
Although "the jury's assessment of punitive damages, while substan-
tial, was found to be not excessive [and did not] shock the Court's
conscience,"'5 7 the district court later ordered a remittitur of punitive
damages to $1,350,000 due to defendant's post-trial conduct in
removing its product from the market.' The court decided that this
latter amount was "intended to represent the jury's assessment regard-
ing the element of punishment and is clearly the proprietary right of
the plaintiffs."' 59 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
went even further to delineate a plaintiff's right to receive the full
amount of the jury's assessment of punitive damages. The Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's remittitur because it was based upon
improper grounds. The court stated that unless an award is excessive
or based upon corruption or prejudice, "the jury's determination of
the damages is considered inviolate."''6 A similar rationale was
employed by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Seaward Construction
Co., Inc. v. Bradley.16' Seaward involved the validity of a claim for
pre-judgment interest on an award of punitive damages. 162 The court
denied the claim, holding that the right to punitive damages accrues
when "awarded by the trier of fact."' 6 3 Legal scholars also recognize
a protectable right in the amount of punitive damages assessed by the
jury, absent a flawed jury determination. "Generally, the plaintiff
who pleads and proves a case for punitive damages is entitled to the
154. 609 F. Supp. 817 (D. Kan. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
155. O'Gilvie, 609 F. Supp. at 817.
156. Id. at 818.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 819. The court determined that the defendant's post-trial conduct had rendered
the original punitive damage award of $10,000,000 excessive. Id.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1449 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 703 F.2d 1152, 1168 (10th Cir.
1981) (en banc) (plurality opinion)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
161. 817 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1991). Seaward was decided on the same day as Kirk v. Denver
Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991). In Kirk, the Colorado Supreme Court struck down
that state's extraction statute. Id. at 273.
162. Seaward, 817 P.2d at 972.
163. Id. at 975.
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full amount awarded by the trier of fact. ' 1
B. The State of the Supreme Court's Current Takings Doctrine
1. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONFUSED TAKINGS DOCTRINE
The American legal community remains perplexed and fasci-
nated by the question of which exercises of governmental power
should fall prey to the constitutional ban on uncompensated tak-
ings of property. Intense interest stems partly from the Supreme
Court's professed inability to provide a general solution to the tak-
ings problem and partly from the undeniable appeal of contrasting
points of view. 165
The Court's muddled takings doctrine may be attributed to the
Court's failure to delineate rules and guidelines regarding which par-
ticular takings test properly applies to a particular type of deprivation
of property. 166 Instead, the Court has adopted an ad hoc approach to
takings challenges. 167
2. THE APPEAL OF A FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE INQUIRY
Although the Supreme Court has inconsistently applied takings
tests, the Court has consistently maintained that the ultimate goal is
to determine whether fairness and justice require that a "taking" by
the government be compensated. 161 Whether a governmental taking
violates the Constitution is fundamentally rooted in notions of fair-
ness and justice. The Court relies upon this principle, either implic-
itly or explicitly, throughout the takings cases. In fact, by directly
applying notions of fairness, one can often better predict the result of
a given Supreme Court takings case than one can by applying the
array of takings tests purportedly used by the Court. 169
Although the Court accords a great deal of deference to state
164. MINZER ET AL., supra note 5, § 40.06, at 40-19; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note
12, § 2; Ausness, supra note 43, at 2.
165. Paul, supra note 141, at 1395-96.
166. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I-
A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1304 (1989).
For example, although the Court has stated that the "no economically viable
use" test applies in the case of a facial challenge, while the Penn Central test
should be used in the case of an "as applied" challenge .... the Court neither has
explained why this should be so, nor has it even consistently followed this rule.
Id. at 1304 n.10. Peterson asserts that the Court's takings doctrine is in such disarray, that it
presents more of a hindrance than a help to lower courts struggling with takings issues. Id. at
1341.
167. Paul, supra note 141, at 1430.
168. Peterson, supra note 166, at 1304.
169. Id. at 1305 n.13.
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regulations,1 70 the Court recognized as early as 1922, in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,171 that a property regulation that "goes too far"
will be considered a taking.' 72 The Court explicitly enunciated fair-
ness and justice as a central issue in Armstrong v. United States.1 73
The Court stated that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against taking private property for public use without just com-
pensation is to prevent "Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole. ' 174 Similarly, in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. City of New York, 1 75 the Court asserted that whether a
compensable taking occurs is ultimately a determination of whether
"justice and fairness" require the government to compensate the indi-
vidual who was deprived of her property.1 76
These cases suggest that an attractive alternative to the jumbled
takings tests is a more direct application of notions of fairness and
justice. 177 This alternative requires the Court to take into considera-
tion the many interests involved, including those of the individual
whose property has been deprived, the governmental entity who has
taken the property, and the general public. Although the Court does
not now explicitly engage in a balancing of interests, its underlying
policy of fairness and justice suggests the presence of an implicit bal-
ancing in its reasoning. A more direct fairness and justice inquiry
acknowledges that there are conflicting values and that a court must
make a choice or compromise between them. Dealing with these val-
ues head-on, rather than hiding behind the confusion created by the
Court's application of its takings tests, could prove valuable as a
means to simplify this perplexing area of the law.
170. Paul, supra note 141, at 1430-3 1.
171. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
172. Id. at 415 ("The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."). Similarly, the
Court held in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978),
that compensation is required only for regulations that effect "an unduly harsh impact."
173. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
174. Id. at 49.
175. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
176. Id. at 124.
177. In fact, Peterson suggests that the very reason that the Court's current takings
"doctrine is not helpful in deciding whether a taking occurred [is] because it does not address
the issue of fairness that the Court tells us is at the heart of every takings case." Peterson,
supra note 166, at 1341. Although Peterson's approach was basically a descriptive study of
Supreme Court cases, she also recognized that fairness notions might provide a promising
solution to the current takings jumble.
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C. Application of Supreme Court Takings Cases and Fundamental
Considerations of Fairness and Justice to State Extraction
Statutes
1. STATE EXTRACTION STATUTES PROVIDE NO QUID PRO QUO
FOR THE LIMITATION ON RECOVERY
When the government statutorily limits the amount of money
that may be recovered in a civil action, "[t]he limitation is clearly a
partial taking. The critical question is whether the statute affords suf-
ficient implicit in-kind compensation."' 78 The Supreme Court applied
this type of takings analysis in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group, Inc. ,i79 even though a due process challenge, not
a takings challenge, was formally before the Court.180 In upholding a
federal statute that limited liability for nuclear power plant accidents,
the Court relied upon the fact that in return for limited damages,
potential victims received a Congressional guarantee of a claims fund
and a Congressional commitment to take all appropriate measures to
protect the public from nuclear power plant accidents.' In applying
this analysis, the Court tapped into the fundamental notions of fair-
ness and justice. That is, the Court implicitly asked whether it is fair
and just for the government to limit a plaintiff's recovery without pro-
viding some benefit in return. Duke informs us that it is not. Just
compensation must be had in some form.
State extraction statutes provide no such in-kind compensation
to plaintiffs. Therefore, these statutes contravene notions of fairness
and justice, which require just compensation for governmental takings
of private property for public use. The lack of in-kind compensation
was a determining factor in McBride v. General Motors Corp.,182
where the court struck down Georgia's extraction statute. The court
adamantly rejected the defendant's argument that a state extraction
statute is analogous to a workers compensation statute or an automo-
bile insurance no-fault act, which legitimately abolish punitive dam-
ages.'1 3 The distinction between a state extraction statute and a
workers compensation statute or an automobile insurance no-fault act
lies in the fact that the latter two provide a quid pro quo for the statu-
178. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 243-44 (1985).
179. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
180. EPSTEIN, supra note 178, at 244.
181. Duke, 438 U.S. at 90-91.
182. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990). Although the court formally addressed a due
process challenge, the analysis of a lack of in-kind compensation is readily applicable to a
takings challenge.
183. Id. at 1574-76.
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tory limitation on recovery. For instance, the quid pro quo of Geor-
gia's no-fault statute was "the elimination of the element of fault and
a rapid or prompt payment of no-fault claims in return for a 'serious
injury' threshold."' 8 4 The compensation provided to the plaintiff by
such a quid pro quo shields a workers compensation statute or an
automobile insurance no-fault act from a constitutional takings chal-
lenge. The lack of such a quid pro quo should condemn a state
extraction statute as an unconstitutional taking.
2. FORCED CONTRIBUTION UNDER STATE EXTRACTION STATUTES
IS NOT REASONABLY RELATED TO THE COSTS OF USING
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a state
may deprive a property owner of its property without violating the
Takings Clause if such action furthers the common good and is more
than a means of forcing a contribution to the state's general reve-
nues. 185 To achieve this status, a statute must substantially advance a
legitimate state goal.86 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beck-
with 187 involved a Florida statute that allowed a county to collect the
interest on an interpleader fund deposited with the county court in
addition to a fee charged for the court's services in receiving the
fund.188 The Court recognized that the claimants held a protected
property right in the interest on the fund even before the award was
entered by final judgment. 189 Rejecting the argument that the statute
is justified because it "takes only what it creates," the Court held that
the statute constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 90 The Court reasoned that the statute did
more than shift economic burdens and benefits in promotion of the
general welfare. Instead, "the extraction is a forced contribution to
general governmental revenues, and it is not reasonably related to the
costs of using the courts."1 91 The statute unconstitutionally placed
184. Id. at 1574.
185. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 153, 163 (1980). This
suggests that where a state expressly asserts revenue generation as one of the purposes behind a
state extraction statute, see, e.g., McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1568, that statute should be
scrutinized to ensure that it is really more than a means of forcing a contribution to the state's
general revenues. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
186. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1987); see also Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 163.
187. 449 U.S. 153 (1980).
188. Id. at 155-56.
189. Id. at 162-63.
190. Id. at 163-64.
191. Id. at 163.
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upon plaintiffs in an action a public burden which, "in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 92
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies provides guidance in analyzing
state extraction statutes for takings issues. First, it informs us that a
protectable property right in an award can accrue before final judg-
ment for purposes of the Takings Clause. 193 The situation in Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies is more analogous to the situation created by
state extraction statutes than are the cases that concentrate on the
right to have the jury assess punitive damages. It is reasonable to
apply the same logic and find a protectable pre-judgment right in a
plaintiff's award of punitive damages after the court has been satisfied
that the amount is not excessive. Second, Webb's Fabulous Pharma-
cies informs us that a statute will not evade constitutional scrutiny
merely because it "takes only what it creates."' 94 This analysis sug-
gests that even if punitive damages are allowed only by statute,1" the
legislature is not free to place any condition whatever on the granting
of punitive damages merely because punitive damages are only
allowed by statute. 196 Third, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies suggests
that a state extraction statute will not withstand a takings challenge
unless it is shown that the allocation of funds to the state is "reason-
ably related to the costs of using the courts."' 97
The Supreme Court recently addressed the same issues as those
raised in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies but reached a seemingly oppo-
site result. United States v. Sperry Corp. 198 involved a federal statute
that apportioned to the United States government a maximum of one
and one-half percent of awards granted by the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal.199 The Court upheld the statute against a takings
challenge on the ground that the one and one-half percent allocation
was reasonably related to the costs incurred by the government in
administering the arbitration tribunal.2°° The Sperry Court indicated
that a different result might follow from a larger apportionment by
the government to itself.2°' Thus, the use of allocated funds and the
192. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
193. Id. at 164.
194. Id. at 163.
195. Courts have relied upon this argument to support state extraction statutes. See, e.g.,
Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 274-75 (Colo. 1991); Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d
800, 801 (Fla. 1992).
196. See also supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
197. 449 U.S. 153, 163 (1980).
198. 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
199. Id. at 54.
200. Id at 60, 62.
201. Id. at 62.
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amount of the award extracted will determine whether such a taking
is constitutional. These factors distinguish Webb's Fabulous Pharma-
cies from Sperry.
This insight suggests that an analogous distinction among state
extraction statutes would determine whether or not a particular state
extraction statute effectuates an unconstitutional taking. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court applied this analysis in Kirk v. Denver Publishing
Co. 202 to strike down Colorado's state extraction statute as an uncon-
stitutional taking. The Kirk court found that there was no reasonable
nexus between an alleged state interest in punishment or deterrence
and "the statutory imposition of the forced contribution on the person
injured by the wrongful conduct."203 In fact, the Kirk court adopted
the reasoning of the Sperry Court in finding that "the governmental
appropriation must bear a reasonable relationship to the governmen-
tal services provided to civil litigants in making use of the judicial
process for the purpose of resolving the civil claim" from which the
apportioned award follows.2" The Colorado statute allocated one-
third of an exemplary damage award to the "state general fund. '20 5
The funds were not designated for any purpose connected with fund-
ing the court system or the civil justice system at all. 206 The Colorado
statute "exact[ed] a forced contribution in order to provide general
governmental revenues and [did] so in a manner and to a degree not
reasonably related to the cost of using the courts.12 7 The court
found it particularly significant that the judgment resulted exclusively
from the plaintiff's "time, effort, and expense in the litigation process
without any assistance whatever from the state."2 8 The court rea-
soned that a significantly smaller allocation to the state might indeed
be defended as reasonably related to the use of the courts, but that a
forced contribution of one-third of a plaintiff's punitive damage
award was not acceptable.20 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The above analysis suggests that in order to satisfy fundamental
202. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991). The dissent in Gordon v. State adopted the reasoning of
Kirk in arguing that Florida's state extraction statute is unconstitutional. 608 So. 2d 800, 803-
04 (Fla. 1992) (Shaw, J., concurring and dissenting).
203. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 273; see also Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 803-04 (Shaw, J., concurring and
dissenting).
204. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 270.
205. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1989).
206. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 271.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 272.
209. Id. at 265.
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notions of fairness and justice, the use of funds extracted by the state
from a punitive damage award must be rationally related to the spe-
cific litigation in which the award was apportioned. Therefore, those
state extraction statutes that give a part of a punitive damage award
to the state's general fund effectuate unconstitutional takings. A strict
construction of this rule also renders unconstitutional those state
extraction statutes that apportion the award to some type of compen-
sation or reparations fund for other plaintiffs. 210 This suggests that
not only were the Georgia and Colorado statutes properly struck
down, but also that the remaining seven extraction statutes are consti-
tutionally infirm as currently written.21'
However, the takings cases may serve to guide the states in for-
mulating extraction statutes that will be constitutionally acceptable.
A statute that apportions to the state a percentage of a punitive dam-
age award that is reasonably related to the cost of using the civil jus-
tice system for that case will probably not be considered an
unconstitutional taking. The statute must clearly designate a fund
that is established for this specific purpose. The question of what per-
centage is fair for the state to extract remains unresolved. United
States v. Sperry Corp. 212 informs us that one and one-half percent is an
acceptable percentage. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co. 213 cautions that
one-third of a punitive damage award is too excessive to be "reason-
ably related to the cost of using the courts ' 214 in any particular litiga-
tion. Because one-third is the least amount apportioned to the state
by any of the current extraction statutes,215 all of these statutes must
be revised in order to comport with the Takings Clause and its funda-
mental principles of fairness and justice.
SHARON G. BURROWS
210. This suggests that Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992), and Burke v. Deere &
Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991), were decided incorrectly. In Burke, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa upheld the Iowa state extraction
statute. The court reasoned that the Iowa statute was different from the Georgia statute in
that the allocated money went to a "civil reparations trust fund to be administered by the
courts" rather than to the state's treasury, as Georgia's statute had provided. Id. at 1242.
Before it was struck down in McBride, the Georgia statute provided for funds to be allocated
to the Fiscal Division's Department of Administrative Services. Id.
211. See supra note 6.
212. 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
213. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1990).
214. Id. at 271.
215. The only possible exception is Illinois' statute, which gives the trial court the discretion
to determine how much of a punitive damage award will be apportioned to the state. See ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).
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